The scientific method is not about finding truth but, assuming there are static rules over time, what is not true (not consistent) relative to some prior theory. Empirical data and the scientific method don't provide truth. They provide, under the assumptions they hold, a way of presenting the probability that something is true or not. The very concept of empiricism precludes real, timeless truth from being discovered.

"That happens because, in order to turn an axiomatic edifice into a prescription, the ideologue needs to assume a fact, a descriptive concept for reality, and sneak that in as an immutable axiom as well. However, any assumptions that are not based in empirical testing cannot under any circumstances be considered true or unchallengeable."

Is a static set of rules in the universe not an assumption? Was it an assumption that has now been tested into truth? Do the worth of axioms to provide truth need to be tested?

http://blog.mises.org/8051/misess-apriorism-again...

Perhaps he puts it better.

Could you provide a source?

It sounds to me a misunderstanding of his separation of human sciences and natural sciences. There are certain facts about the universe that are accepted. The action axiom. All others are derived from that from logic and empirical analysis as Rothbard points out. The point made is that reality is not omnisciently and objectively observable. Empirical data is open to interpretation and one can't have a control. If you have certain a priori derived facts... they can't be reconsidered unless the logic is wrong. That people act and the logically derived facts are no more reconsiderable than that a triangle has 3 sides. It's a different kind of knowledge. Note the last couple paragraphs.

From chapter 2 of Human Action:

The subject matter of all historical sciences is the past. They cannot teach us anything which would be valid for all human actions, that is, for the future too. The study of history makes a man wise and judicious. But it does not by itself provide any knowledge and skill which could be utilized for handling concrete tasks.

The natural sciences too deal with past events. Every experience is an experience of something passed away; there is no experience of future happenings. But the experience to which the natural sciences owe all their success is the experience of the experiment in which the individual elements of change can be observed in isolation. The facts amassed in this way can be used for induction, a peculiar procedure of inference which has given pragmatic evidence of its expediency, although its satisfactory epistemological characterization is still an unsolved problem.

The experience with which the sciences of human action have to deal is always an experience of complex phenomena. No laboratory experiments can be performed with regard to human action. We are never in a position to observe the change in one element only, all other conditions of the event remaining unchanged. Historical experience as an experience of complex
phenomena does not provide us with facts in the sense in which the natural sciences employ this term to signify isolated events tested in experiments.

The information conveyed by historical experience cannot be used as building material for the construction of theories and the prediction of future events. Every historical experience is open to various interpretations, and is in fact interpreted in different ways.

The postulates of positivism and kindred schools of metaphysics are therefore illusory. It is impossible to reform the sciences of human action according to the pattern of physics and the other natural sciences. There is no means to establish an a posteriori theory of human conduct and social events. History can neither prove nor disprove any general statement in the manner in which the natural sciences accept or reject a hypothesis on the ground of laboratory experiments. Neither experimental verification nor
experimental falsification of a general proposition is possible in its field.

Complex phenomena in the production of which various causal chains are interlaced cannot test any theory. Such phenomena, on the contrary, become intelligible only through an interpretation in terms of theories previously developed from other sources. In the case of natural phenomena the interpretation of an event must not be at variance with the theories satisfactorily verified by experiments. In the case of historical events there is no such restriction. Commentators would be free to resort to quite arbitrary explanations. Where there is something to explain, the human mind has never been at a loss to invent ad hoc some imaginary theories, lacking any logical justification.

In the field of human history a limitation similar to that which the experimentally tested theories enjoin upon the attempts to interpret and elucidate individual physical, chemical, and physiological events is provided by praxeology. Praxeology is a theoretical and systematic, not a historical, science. Its scope is human action as such, irrespective of all environmental, accidental, and individual circumstances of the concrete acts. Its cognition is purely formal and general without reference to the material content and the particular features of the actual case. It aims at knowledge valid for all instances in which the conditions exactly correspond to those implied in its assumptions and inferences. Its statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts.

They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. Without them we should not be able to see in the course of events anything else than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle.

“Human Action” Misoids. I'm not sure I understand.

There is certainly empiricism in the Austrian School. Mises was a consequencialist and besides the fundamental action axiom everything else is empirical.
http://mises.org/rothbard/extreme.pdf

It would seem that since many Austrians study history they must have interest in empirical evidence.

Have you contacted Kiva regarding the inability to sort on partner's interest? Or on the interest by that particular partner? Perhaps it's an opportunity for someone near them for fund a new partner?