Little Alex
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13 years ago @ News From Antiwar.com - US Envoy Vows to Shiel... · 0 replies · +2 points
13 years ago @ Antiwar.com Blog - Stan the Man and the p... · 0 replies · +1 points
Good post, Ms. Vlahos.
13 years ago @ News From Antiwar.com - McChrystal on Hot Seat... · 0 replies · +1 points
13 years ago @ Antiwar Radio with Sco... - Kelley B. Vlahos · 0 replies · +1 points
A theory I've bounced around a couple of closed circles: You have a political time bomb in a war/occupation (Point A) and COIN isn't a beating into submission so much as building up an occupation of such a large force (Point B) that the political gains come from beginning to draw that force down (point C). But C is a larger force than A, and since B is so exponentially large that it makes people beg for anything but B; therefore, C becomes a godsend and populations organize, local security forces get more draconian to deter another B. The end result is more political capital at point C than point A and this is called success, no matter what the cost of B.
Coincidentally though, B is so forceful that point C, simultaneously, is more in need of a prolonged occupation than A because of the havoc wreaked by B -- the de facto garrison state. Point A can't be sustained, politically -- this is Petraeus' dissertation and the common military narrative that Vietnam was lost on American streets, not the Asian jungles. But a large part of C is the constant reminder of what B was communicated as fighting and those boogeymen justify what A couldn't.
I haven't written in depth about this because I'm still sifting through the CNAS boys' idealizing of B -- mainly, Exum, the theorist, as opposed to Petraeus, the commander, and McChrystal, the executive -- and want to collect more input, organize a better academic critique. If I'm unclear, I could make a visual. I've sketched a few and would like to digitize one anyway.