I am also going to ratify, mainly for the reasons from VectorZ, Martinlady, and ATCBB. I feel not ratifying gives tacit approval to the FAA's misguided leadership policies of the last three years.

Here is the process in case we don't ratify (or agency head review isn't successful): within a period not to exceed 45 calendar days, those items will be resubmitted to the Panel, which shall, within 24 hours of receipt, schedule a second set of Additional Sessions, not to exceed 3 days, for the parties to present their final positions. The format will follow that discussed in Par. d, above. Following receipt of these closing presentations, the Panel will convene in executive session to render an expedited decision, within 30 days which; at the Panel's option, may include the award only without supporting opinion, on each of the items in dispute.

I would be willing to bet (though I'm not a betting man) that if we don't ratify, the arbitrators will most likely enforce the TAUed articles on us.

I agree, ZHU controller. We got a contract, maybe not as much to our liking as we wanted, but FAR better than we have had over the last three years (and far better than we would have continued to be stuck with). And those who were lied to about their pay over the last three years (particularly the 1440) are getting some equitable pay that they should have gotten. Does it make up for the lost pay over the last three years, no, but it goes to some length to rectify some of the issue.

I don't understand the logic of voting ratification down to punish the FAA for the past three years. I think they have received the indictment of their actions of the IWRs through the language in the preamble of the arbitrators decision. The logic of punishing them by voting down the new contract and potentially being stuck with the IWRs longer does not really make sense.

I believe, though I might be mistaken, if the contract does not ratify, it goes back to arbitration. The arbitrators will most likely enforce the TAUed articles anyway. Caveat: I do not have intimate knowledge of the process so this is really only a guess.

The HFACS report is only one of them. CAMI also did a Human Factors review of lit on OEs. That may be the best study to read if you want a synopsis of the OE research. Plus its not as esoteric as most of the other studies they've done. The five year number is in that report, page iii. http://www.faa.gov/library/reports/medical/oamtec...
Several studies have found that controllers with five
years or less experience (after certification) were more
susceptible to OEs than were more experienced
controllers.
Here are the major results of their review:
The amount of traffic measured on a national basis is the
single most important determinant of the frequency of
OEs. However, while the amount of traffic increased at
overall in the NAS, the amount of traffic in a sector when
an OE occurs has generally remained unchanged.
A relatively high percentage of OEs occurred during
the first 20 minutes on position. That relationship was
consistent across options and during much of the day.
While this result was often linked with position relief
briefings, only a small percentage of OEs were attributed
to the causal factor in the OE reporting form related to
position relief briefings.
Pilot/controller miscommunications were historically
identified as a primary causal factor associated with OEs
and hearback/readback errors were studied most often.
Although analysis of recorded communications revealed
that few hearback/readback errors resulted in an OE,
a sizeable proportion of OEs were attributed to hearback/
readback errors. One set of studies found a strong
relationship between the complexity of the controller’s
transmission and the probability of a readback error in
the en route and TRACON environments.
And the less frequent results:
One study found a statistically significant relationship
between the decline in supervisory staffing and
the overall increase in OEs.
Another study found that higher percentages
of OEs
occurred in moderate
to heavy traffic complexity
conditions,
suggesting that the interaction of the
amount of traffic with traffic complexity may affect
OEs more than the amount of traffic alone. Other
studies also identified sector complexity as a factor
contributing to OEs.
Several studies have found that controllers with five
years or less experience (after certification) were more
susceptible to OEs than were more experienced
controllers.
Several studies related OEs to problems with perception
and vigilance. However, a lack of information
about these factors on the OE reporting form prevented
an in-depth analysis of these causal factors.
Although memory failures were associated with OEs
in all ATC environments, much of the memory
literature relevant to OEs was in the context of
runway incursions. Several studies found memory
failures to be the most frequently cited causal factor
of tower OEs.

Forgot one comment:
Research by CAMI has shown that people with less than five years FPL experience are at an increased statistical risk of having an error. We all know the massive amount of training and inexperience that the system now has staffing it. Another CAMI finding is that the most important determinant of OE rates is traffic by facility. That being said, OE rates nationwide are up (from what I've seen as of a few weeks ago) while traffic is down by about 14%. When traffic picks back up, we are going to see a massive error spike.

I agree with you that the PE creation was an attempt to placate people who don't understand the system. It was a blatant attempt, in my opinion, to statistically skew the errors nationwide. The majority of errors are Cs and PEs. I do know that people, myself included (I'm on NATCA's National Safety Committee and am almost done with a PhD), have talked to CAMI and the Tech Center researchers about creating a more objective, but more indicative of the systems weaknesses, severity classification system. The system was changed because the old system wasn't objective enough.
About ATSAP, the program was intended to capture those elements of latent error that might crop up in the system. Latent error are elements of the system that can assist in the development of an error. Latent error can be organization factors, management issues, systemic breakdowns, etc. See Reason's swiss cheese model: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_Cheese_model. Latent error is especially dangerous because it is not generally readily apparent until a document incident occurs. Many of these problems we as controllers already know about, though we are all aware that the UCR program is absolutely busted. ATSAP can have some impact in identifying these problems IF people file reports. One report of a situation will be construed as an isolated incident, many will become the impetus for correction in the system. The OE/OD protection is important in attempting to move toward a non-punitive systems approach rather than a divisive person approach.

To lessthngruntled, what the FLM did is a violation of the MOU (soon to be in the 2009 CBA) and is grievable. The FLM actions cannot supersede what the ERC recommends and cannot create skill enhancement where none is recommended. However, if the individual involved does not file an ATSAP report, then the FLM can do whatever they deem necessary under their "requirement" to do performance management, however misguided it might be. If you want, email me at dbricker @ natca . net and I can pursue the problem through your regional safety rep and the committee chair (S. Hansen).