rajivmw, Citizen may not be a "Sir", just as I may not be a male frog.

More substantively, Citizen's point -- as I read it -- was not that Buddhist philosophy does not have within it wonderful resources for forming and shaping a better society -- I would agree with you that it does -- but that that it might be less amenable (than Christianity) to being used by the lay people to challenge the hierarchies of religious order and State.

The assumption, I suppose, is that an important ingredient of "reforming" and "improving" is the ability to challenge status-quo and institutions of power with something other than violence. Societies in which people don't find the resources to do that might tend to become worse over time.

I can see the point you make -- by citing Islam -- that it is not necessarily the belief in an all powerful God that creates that empowering possibility. So I wonder what it is that creates such empowerment, if Citizen is right.

Is it that the Christian God in Jesus takes the side of the weak and the victim, becoming himself the object of harassment by Church and State? So, not just an all powerful God, but one who chooses in a very special way to identify and be identified with the down-trodden? One who might right now, be more easily identified with the trapped civilians in the Vanni, than with the causes of the Army or the LTTE? I don't know.

But I digress. The point I wanted to make is that it is not about the theoretical theological/philosophical resources but about the sociological consequences of that theology/philosophy which Citizen seems to be speaking -- at least to my reading.

Is it factually correct that Sri Lankan Buddhists are highly tolerant of non-Buddhists as repeatedly claimed in these comments? The fact that many have converted to Christianity can hardly be used as evidence of tolerance, it could equally well be evidence of Buddhist leadership and teaching in Sri Lanka becoming less attractive.

(That masses of Dalits converted to Buddhism in South India, for instance, was hardly evidence of Hindus being tolerant -- they responded with the anti-conversion bill, which Sri Lanka is now trying to copy. In India, however, conversion to Buddhism continues with renewed vigour; see:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/38... )

The freedoms that are provided for other religions in Sri Lanka are in practice less than those provided to Buddhism, which enjoy special status. In most democratic countries no one religion is given such special status. There are numerous incidents of organised violence against churches in Sri Lanka, which (like with the current violence against journalists) are exempt from justice. All this undermines the argument that Sri Lankan Buddhist practice is specially tolerant. Available evidence, including the current anti-conversion bill, seems to be more in favour of the contrary argument about Buddhist tolerance.

Ironically, trying to prevent people leaving Buddhism by such unattractive attitudes and practices, may simply cause good people to be even more disillusioned by Buddhism.

Religious faiths are often attractive for the self-lessness and kindness they espouse in a harsh world, not because they mirror the entrenched selfishness and power dynamics of society.

Buddhists who beat the drums of state power and with it the anti-conversion bill may not have converted to Chrisitanity, but they have already converted away from the teachings of the Buddha. It is indeed a sad time for Buddhism in Sri Lanka.

Dear sir Blacker, you paint a most unappealing picture of "the public". Do they really have mindsets that are apathetic to the killing of people they consider "biased wankers"? BWs may deserve a lot of things, but murder by killer squads? If that's the general human spirit in this country, let me say, I am as glad as ever to be a Frog.

But, sir Blacker, do you not see that the "point" of all the "bowing and saluting" is *precisely* to "prevent the next such killing"? Will you not join in?

The Consumer Affairs Authority (CAA) Act No 9 of 2003, sets out laws and principles with regard to Pricing Policy; Anti-competitive Practices of trade and Consumer Rights. So, perhaps, Sri Lanka does have some measure of competition laws, and the question of violating them could arise. In this case we have the unusual scenario that the violation is by the govt. itself, which means the CAA may not function as anticipated by the laws -- which might constitute a type of procedural failure opening the door for Supreme Court intervention.

Quite apart from that, the Court also explains in the order why it considers itself to have jurisdiction on the matter. To quote from the order:

"As noted above, the imposition of the Excise Duty in terms of Section 3(1) of Act No. 13 of 1989 and the imposition of customs duties and the grant of partial waivers as stated in Annex ‘A’ in terms of section 10A and 10A of the Customs Ordinance are executive functions that come within the purview of the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the court. The alleged infringements result from illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable executive action. The Secretary being the appropriate functionary and the Attorney General who represents the President in terms of article 35(3) of the Constitution have been heard on the several days this matter was considered. Accordingly we direct that necessary orders be made in terms of the applicable law to give effect to the content of Annex ‘A’ which has been prepared by the secretary to the Treasury." (as cited in http://transcurrents.com/tc/2008/12/post_206.html...

Therefore, at least as claimed, the interim order is against arbitrary exercise of executive function, not against the legislative prerogative of parliament.

While appreciating (and perhaps even sharing) Rohan's concerns about the Supreme Court introducing "reasonableness" criteria, I can't agree that such usage automatically falls foul of legal or constitutional principles. I would have agreed if he asserted that no other Court other than the Supreme Court should be able to do so.

One does not have to agree with the Supreme Court to recognise that the case involves several sets of legal and constitutional principles, further complicated by the particular peculiarity of the market structure and ownership in the Petroleum Industry of Sri Lanka. The talking frog does not imagine that there is a clear and incontestable justification of the Courts actions. But he is puzzled by claims of there being NO justification WHATSOEVER, despite there being much to be said in support, on the basis of legal/constitutional principles.

All that said, the talking frog will desist from offering any further two-cents on this subject.

I appreciate Rohan's comment and am quite in agreement. If, however, it was meant as an answer to the question on which I ended my previous comment, then my question has been misunderstood (or inadvertently side-stepped).

The Courts can and should intervene in the decisions of the legislature/govt., when fundamental principles of law (normally spelled out in the constitution) are seen to be violated by the laws or regulations that are passed. For instance, people can go to the courts if they are arbitrarily dismissed from govt. employment and the Court could insist that the job be reinstated. This does not mean that the Court has taken over the hiring decisions of the govt. -- which would be absurd.

Taxation decision need not be considered a special class of decisions in which such normal recourse to judicial review are disallowed. It is I think right and appropriate to ask about and discuss the principles of law the Courts could use to justify their intervention in decisions of taxation. But avoiding that discussion by making the blanket (and rather strange) assumption that taxation decisions should be sacrosanct -- in a way that other legislative/govt. decisions are not -- is to set up a red-herring, and it is not the way forward for a thoughtful discussion on the subject.

In this case, the govt. arbitrarily and suddenly introduced a massive increase in the taxation of petrol, in a manner that was designed to offset advantages to the consumer from the decline in world market prices, and was anti-competitive against IOC (violating the principle of the government's own competition laws). Prima facie there seems to be a good case for judicial review, both in terms of equal treatment of commercial entities and abuse of monopoly power (another area of law that comes under the jurisdiction of the courts).

The Court has not as yet decided the case on the basis of either of these principles. What it has issued is an interim injunction to maintain something closer to what the status quo was in taxes, while the case is being heard to completion. Interim injunctions that prevent wild departures from the status quo until a complaint has been decided upon, are quite in-keeping with the principles of proper judicial intervention. (Or so thinks the talking frog, though he admits to knowing less about the law than about economics).

The Supreme Court is reported to have directed that taxes on petrol should not be more than 100 percent of the cost of petrol (assuming a cost price of approx. US$ 56 a barrel of crude oil). This would mean, contrary to RMB's opinion, changing the taxes.

Indeed, to meet RMB's criterion, of not allowing profiteering from petrol, the Supreme Court would HAVE to fix the taxes. This is because the CPC is fully government owned. At any given price, the CPC can profit with low taxes, or instead the government can profits with high taxes -- but the revenues go in to the same pocket.

It seems clear that the government chose the method of high taxes so that it can cream off the profits from Indian Oil Company (IOC) as well, in addition to preventing price competition from IOC.

The basis in law for the Supreme Court intervening/or not in the taxation decisions of the government is worthy of discussion -- it's not clear to me why I should believe the pundits or Ministers who say that decisions on taxation CANNOT be subject to review or intervention by the Supreme Court. On what precise constitutional or legal principle does that claim rest? Humbly asks the talking Frog.