The Space Review: China’s new space threat and the justification of US pre-emptive self-defens Comments

loupgarous303

Sat, 30 Jan 2016 03:03:38 +0000

While it's tempting and cool to see the Chinese "patrolling space" concept as a splendid opportunity to get a pre-emptive ability to kill their satellites, I think it's only part of a sound space dominance capability. Another thing we need to do is make enemy targeting of our GPS constellation and Imaging assets less consequential than it is now. And that requires cheaper spacelift, more spacelift, and perhaps even orbital transfer vehicles in orbit which can replace at least some of our defense satellites. This both makes an ASAT kill of one of our satellites less militarily effective than it might be and raises the threshhold for such attacks if they can be either pre-empted effectively or the assets we lose replaced promptly. The capacity to retaliate by our own actions against the enemy's navigation and imaging satellites is the third piece of a sound space dominance strategy. The more ways we have to do this, the better, for it's impractical for a satellite designer to place countermeasures against all possible threats on his birds. As far as the legal implications of a pre-emptive strike against enemy satellites, almost our entire conventional and nuclear strike capacity depends on our GPS constellation being intact for its accuracy. Weapon systems such as the JDAM and SDB absolutely depend on the GPS being there. So a strike against our GPS or imaging satellites is the first strike of a war in which the enemy is counting on a surprise degradation of our ability to hit their assets for success. In such a case, the legal maxim is "Silent leges inter arma" - "the law is silent in the midst of arms." Other mitigation measures we ought to be very actively considering is alternate signal sources for precision-guided arms in addition to GPS. Long loiter time UAVs can give military decision-makers imagery which is as good as or better than satellite overheads, can designate targets for guided bombs and missiles, and give decision-makers good bomb damage assessment. For the probable delivered price of an F-35, we can get 10-20 high-quality, advanced capability drone aircraft such as General Atomics Aeronautical Systems' Predator-C/"Avenger". In an environment where we might not be able to rely on GPS or overhead satellite images, the ability to use net-centric swarms of drones to replace the overhead imaging and target designation capacities we lose to enemy action might mean the difference between winning or losing a war.

Guest

Sun, 24 Jan 2016 19:41:27 +0000

I want a big laser with a nuclear pile launched by SLS myself--everything else is just a target.

@briangchow

Sun, 24 Jan 2016 04:28:55 +0000

This is a response to questions and comments from Charles Houston during our exchanges on Jan 21. (1) Most geostationary satellites rarely stray beyond a 30-km band around their designated geostationary positions and only rarely move to a position that is more than 0.1 degree (74 km) from its allocated location; when that happens, its commercial owner often informs others who own neighboring satellites. (2) There is currently no international norm that says that a country cannot simultaneously inspect several satellites at once. I argue that a country including the US should not be allowed to have space objects in the same orbits and close to several of another country's satellites. (3) "several" can be 2, 3, or 4, while the ultimate number should be a number comfortable to the US Department of Defense and acceptable to at least US allies and friends, if not China, Russia and other countries. Similarly, the same approach and parties should be used to decide how close is too close, and how "similar" is considered the "same" orbit. I argue that there are feasible and practical choices for these thresholds so that pre-emptive self-defense cannot be used a pre-text for aggression. (4) Approaching satellites could not lure us into a pre-emptive strike, because our strike would only be executed after approaching satellites have violated all thresholds (e.g. number of space objects, closeness to our satellites and being in same orbits). These violations are observable and verifiable by not only the US but also China, Russia and other countries. (5)You said that "it would be very unlikely that we would ever pre-emptively strike." I argue, under the current US defense posture, the US could be between a rock and a hard place. Either the US strikes and is considered to be the aggressor in starting a space war or the US is deterred from intervening in the conflict as several critical satellites could be destroyed, and, without which, the intervention could not be successful.

@briangchow

Thu, 21 Jan 2016 04:12:30 +0000

Duncan, a multi-lateral agreement, including China, Russia, US, and US allies and friends, in not posing a threatening configuration of space objects tailgating any other country's several satellites simultaneously is my ultimate goal. Step one is for the US in seeking allies and friends to support the principle of pre-emptive self-defense, which can only be exercised under unambiguous, observable and justifiable situations declared during peacetime and to invite other countries especially China and Russia to participate in the design and establishment of this multi-lateral agreement. However, I am concerned that China and Russia will not agree to this principle or will drag the negotiation of the agreement on indefinitely. In that likely scenario, the US and its allies and friends would have to declare that they will not pose the simultaneous space stalker threat to any country including China and Russia, but US may exercise the justifiable right of pre-emptive self-defense if China, Russia or other country pose such a threat to the US, even if they do not join the agreement.

Duncan

Thu, 21 Jan 2016 00:29:34 +0000

Brian (Chow), it seems like your point is similar to the point made by Brian (Weeden) - that something like the ‘Incidents at Sea’ agreement should be settled between the US and China. Your point is quite specific though. If I may attempt to paraphrase this article and your other articles, as well as your replies to comments on this article, then what you appear to suggest is that the US and China should agree on de-escalatory measures that could be taken in respect of satellite operations that give rise to apprehension of imminent hostilities. If that is the approach you intend, then I agree. It seems like a constructive approach to what could otherwise become a ‘conflict spiral’, as Mark Gubrud succinctly describes. I tend to agree with Mark that a unilateral declaration by the US in specific terms about a right of ‘pre-emptive’ self defence, combined with active steps to develop the capability for ‘pre-emptive’ self defence, is only likely to escalate the conflict spiral. I am also concerned about the requirement of imminence and immediacy. To complete your reference to the Caroline case, Webster suggested that the party claiming a right of self defence would have to show “the necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation”. In your article you assert that “in the case of space stalkers, there is no time for referral and no other ways than pre-emption to neutralize the imminent threat.” I feel that this needs more explanation. You also make a reference to the attack on Pearl Harbour, so I will expand on that to illustrate the difficulties that international legal scholars have had in delimiting what is justifiable ‘anticipatory self defence’ versus unjustifiable ‘pre-emptive self defence’. At what point did a right of anticipatory self defence arise - was it when the first Japanese aircraft released a bomb, was it when the first Japanese aircraft took off from a carrier, was it when the Japanese fleet reached a certain proximity to Pearl Harbour, was it when the ships assumed a formation in accordance with their plans for the attack, was it when they left harbour, was it when the the order was given to execute the plan, was it when the plans were drawn up, was it when the ships were built? I think that there are circumstances where ’space stalkers’ could be regarded as presenting an imminent threat, but a threshold number is a somewhat arbitrary way of determining what is ‘imminent’. However, I think you implicitly acknowledge that it is arbitrary and you suggest a threshold as a means of avoiding an unnecessary conflict spiral - which is why it seems like your suggestion is similar to Brian Weeden’s suggestion about settling a bilateral agreement on proactive measures to de-escalate situations in space that give rise to apprehension of hostilities. I think this is a more practical and constructive approach than a unilateral declaration by the US in specific terms about a right of ‘pre-emptive’ self defence, combined with active steps to develop the capability for ‘pre-emptive’ self defence. I think it is sufficient for the US to continue to assert, in general terms, that it has a right of self defence and that extends to space, but it would be best to leave it to multi-lateral fora and/or legal scholars (independent of politics) to be more specific about such rights. An ‘Incidents in Space’ agreement would not be about rights - it would be about practical measures to de-escalate dangerous situations.

@briangchow

Wed, 20 Jan 2016 19:06:48 +0000

In response to Charles Houston's comment, I hope you would take a look at my first commentary, Avoiding Space War Needs a New Approach, which you can access by clicking the cited title in the current commentary or just googling the title. Basically, I am suggesting pre-emption against only a very specific and observable threatening configuration of simultaneously stalking multiple US satellites. US also returns the favor by not doing the same to other countries' satellites.

CharlesHouston

Wed, 20 Jan 2016 17:55:32 +0000

Can we put some context to this article? In WWII, Japan attacked the U.S. after we cut off supplies of raw materials to them (oil, steel, etc). Today, there is greatly increased international economic interdependence. China needs the U.S. to continue importing socks!! They may act belligerent in small things but they understand that they need us. Russia is aggressive but they know that they need international trade. The chance of them attacking us is still remote. Smaller countries like Iran might directly attack since they are already sponsoring small attacks. That being said, of course many countries have done foolish things and caused themselves trouble, it could happen again. Still, an attack on a space asset would not cause injury or death to a person (immediately) and this attack would be a warning of a possible impending attack against military forces or other people. We could view an attack against a space asset as we would view someone knocking down our fence - a reasonable response would be to attack an adversary's similar assets. But we should question the justification for a preemptive strike. We can continue to operate without our space assets, they are a early warning system. So a preemptive strike carries too great a risk of causing what we fear. Hopefully we can have international understanding of where the "trip wires" are so that countries do not blunder into a conflict.

@briangchow

Wed, 20 Jan 2016 06:00:06 +0000

Katibu Maduka, you may find my response to Katana and my first cited commentary, Avoiding Space War Need a New Approach, relevant to your comment..

@briangchow

Wed, 20 Jan 2016 05:55:14 +0000

In response to Katana's comment, I argue that the US should declare that it would not place multiple space objects simultaneously in close proximity to another country's satellites in exchange for other countries not doing the same to US satellites. This is a fair and justifiable trade. I consider that this declaration and understanding in peacetime are much more stabilizing than the current situation where no one knows the rule of engagement. One side thinks that it is fine to place multiple space objects simultaneously close to other side's satellites and consider any pre-emption by the other side to be aggressive and trigger a space war, which both sides try to avoid and which can spread to earth.

@briangchow

Wed, 20 Jan 2016 05:36:23 +0000

In response to Derek Webber's comment, I argue that, precisely because one cannot reliably tell whether space objects are peaceful spacecraft for orbital refueling/ service or threatening stalkers, these space objects are only prohibited from tailgating multiple US satellites at the same time as discussed in my first cited commentary, Avoiding Space War Needs a New Approach.

@briangchow

Wed, 20 Jan 2016 05:22:43 +0000

In response to Mark Gubrud's comment, I argue that space-based stalkers allow near-simultaneous multiple attacks with too little warning for defense, while it would be hard to do the same with earth-based ASATs. If you are worried about the placement of countering weapons in space and there is space-based weapon ban agreement in force, the defender can use earth-based assets, such as re-purposed ballistic missiles or, better yet, jamming or spoofing the communications links used to control space stalkers, as discussed in my second cited commentary, Fund Pre-emptive Self-Defense in Space.

Katibu Maduka

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 23:56:33 +0000

This article assume that the United States of America is innocent of any wrong doings. This writing appear to state that all countries must yield to the will of the United States of America. If anyone want to take notice they will see that many countries are starting to cooperate with each in space maters rather the United States of America like it or not. And when it come to space settlement these countries will do it without the United States of America.

@briangchow

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 19:44:09 +0000

(Continuation of previous comment) Both Brian Weeden and Yousaf Butt are concerned about the use of space-based weapons for pre-emption. It is best to use earth-based assets such as re-purposed ballistic missiles as discussed in my cited commentary, Fund Pre-emptive Self-Defense in Space. Whether space-based interceptors can be used would depend on the type and details of the agreement about weapons in space. Yousaf, my response to your questions can be found in my two cited commentaries.

@briangchow

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 19:42:34 +0000

I believe Brian Weeden and I are in agreement on the following key points: devil is in the details; a need to work out those details; pre-emption against co-orbital space stalkers could be justified; and the establishment of rules of engagement. I do not consider pre-emption to be a silver bullet against all space threats. For example, I argue that pre-emption is justified only against multiple near-simultaneous stalkers but not a single stalker, because the latter occurs inevitably for peaceful civilian and military purposes. The national and international discussions should specify the conditions under which pre-emption is justified by applying the over 100 years of studies on self-defense to the current situations in space. In the worst extreme, even if pre-emption were justified only against multiple space stalkers but not against any other space threats, pre-emption would still be stabilizing and should still be declared as the rule of engagement applicable to multiple space stalker threat alone. We would rely on other defense measures including traditional ones to deter other space threats.

Occam's Katana

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 14:33:29 +0000

The problem with a pre-emptive doctrine is that it means you implicitly grant the other side the same privilege. If you say "We have the right to preemptively eliminate what we regard as your antisatellite assets," then you have given them the right to say "We have the right to preemptively defend our satellites against your aggression," throwing your own rationale back at you. Then when anyone acts, there is no moral or legal clarity about who is at fault, since both sides have abandoned the basic concept of self-defense in favor of just destroying the other's property whenever they deem it convenient. War is not deterred at that point, it is invited.

Derek Webber

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 12:00:19 +0000

How do we know that these spacecraft were not merely testing out, say, orbital refueling or orbital servicing activities for their own domestic spacecraft?

Mark Gubrud

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 09:19:50 +0000

There is no need to place "stalkers" in orbits which make the targets apparent; the ASATs can be stationed either on Earth or in orbits that put them closer to their targets but not synchronized with them. The author's hypothesis is that China might want to make the threat explicit as a form of deterrence. If they did so, the US would probably respond in some way, possibly as the author suggests. However, this would only point the way to the next round of placement of countering weapons in space, and as the process continued we would be wiring up an explosive confrontation, with time lines for decision and response measured in minutes, seconds or less. If any (possibly accidental) event triggered this bomb, the war might start in space but would not end there. So, this is a road to avoid going down.

ybutt

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 00:51:46 +0000

How does one define space-stalker? Is the threat limited to space stalkers? Can space weapons protect US satellites? see: http://thebulletin.org/can-space-weapons-protect-...

Jim R.

Mon, 18 Jan 2016 23:29:02 +0000

Why would placing space-based interceptors on orbit be considered untenable?

@brianweeden

Mon, 18 Jan 2016 23:12:55 +0000

I think most reasonable people would agree that self-defense applies in space, including preemption. But the devil, as always, is in the details. At the moment, there's no consensus in the international community about self-defense in space, let alone preemption. Most (but not all) countries agree it exists, but there's no clarity on what it entails and what the boundaries are. I think there's a clear need to have a broader national and international discussion to work out those details, something my organization has already begun to look at: http://swfound.org/media/205308/scenario-workshop... A lot depends on what types of preemptive attacks are being considered. If a co-orbital ASAT maneuvers from its standby location into an trajectory that conjuncts with a critical U.S. military satellite, I think most would agree that preemptively interfering with or even destroying the ASAT using some sort of point defense could be justified. But preemption that includes placing space-based interceptors in orbit would probably be considered untenable by most countries, and using preemption to protect allied or commercial satellites would be very murky. A more pragmatic approach might be to focus on the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for how military satellites of the US and its adversaries interact in space. In the air and maritime domains there are well-established norms for how military aircraft and vessels interact that both minimize mistakes and accidents while allowing for self-defense. Perhaps something like a space version of the incidents at sea agreement could be worked out between the US and Russia and China: http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm