pretzalcoatl
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15 weeks ago @ Wonkette - 'The New Republic' Sin... · 0 replies · +3 points
That masthead still makes a minyan
32 weeks ago @ Wonkette - Hero Connecticut Supre... · 5 replies · +22 points
Footnote 20:
Indeed, as the Appellate Court suggested; see State v. Fourtin, supra,
118 Conn. App. 49; this appears to be a case in which the state ultimately
proceeded against the defendant under the wrong statute. Originally, the
state also had charged the defendant with sexual assault in the second
degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (2), attempt to commit sexual assault in
the second degree in violation of §§ 53a-71 (a) (2) and 53a-49 (a) (2), and
sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev.
to 2005) § 53a-73a (a) (1) (B), all of which require that the victim be unable
to consent to sexual intercourse because the victim is ‘‘mentally defective
. . . .’’ Because the evidence established that the victim’s cognitive abilities
are significantly limited, the state could well have prosecuted the defendant
under those provisions. The record does not indicate why the state decided
not to do so and opted instead to pursue charges requiring proof that the
victim was physically helpless. By electing to prove that the victim was
physically helpless rather than mentally defective, the state removed from
the case all issues pertaining to the victim’s mental capacity to consent to sex.
So basically, shitty prosecutor
Indeed, as the Appellate Court suggested; see State v. Fourtin, supra,
118 Conn. App. 49; this appears to be a case in which the state ultimately
proceeded against the defendant under the wrong statute. Originally, the
state also had charged the defendant with sexual assault in the second
degree in violation of § 53a-71 (a) (2), attempt to commit sexual assault in
the second degree in violation of §§ 53a-71 (a) (2) and 53a-49 (a) (2), and
sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes (Rev.
to 2005) § 53a-73a (a) (1) (B), all of which require that the victim be unable
to consent to sexual intercourse because the victim is ‘‘mentally defective
. . . .’’ Because the evidence established that the victim’s cognitive abilities
are significantly limited, the state could well have prosecuted the defendant
under those provisions. The record does not indicate why the state decided
not to do so and opted instead to pursue charges requiring proof that the
victim was physically helpless. By electing to prove that the victim was
physically helpless rather than mentally defective, the state removed from
the case all issues pertaining to the victim’s mental capacity to consent to sex.
So basically, shitty prosecutor
Opus