lukeprog's Comments

the Jesus Manifesto : From Faith to Common Sense Atheism

Sat, 18 Apr 2009 05:00:48 +0000

I think I understand the argument now and I think it is unsound, due to many false premises. Also, it has never been presented as a valid argument. >> You can't tell me that they saw a typhoon and they thought "Ohh well, it must be a higher being!" << Yes, I can. This happens all the time. You severely underestimate the human imagination. >> wolves and dolphins don't have ANY sort of mystical hierarchy << Yes they do. For example, please see the superstitious pigeon. >> People can't even prove with absolute certainty how old the Universe is, but you want the proof of God??? << I don't want proof of God. I want the exact same kinds of reasons I would want for anything else. I want evidence that outweighs the improbability of the claim given our background knowledge. If you tell me there is a Buick in your garage, a simple check of your garage would satisfy me. If you tell me there is an invisible dragon in your garage who is not detectable by any physical means and yet he has magical powers and can physically affect things all around the world and read millions of minds simultaneously and grants you magical wishes and has created alternate non-physical realms as possible destinies for your immortal, invisible soul... well then I'm going to need some pretty decent evidence to believe such a thing, and I'm right to ask for it.

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 17:31:13 +0000

Found it! I've added that link to my earlier preview of the BCNT. I haven't read your work yet but I've read summaries of your arguments against evolutionary morality and I thought, "Yup, I agree with all that!"

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 17:16:38 +0000

Agreed! And I often lament that none of these fine atheistic philosophers have also been mastering debating skills their entire lives like Craig has, so there really is no atheistic counterpart to Craig. He is in a class by himself.

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 17:14:48 +0000

It\\'s just a word confusion. Look up \\"atheism\\" in a dictionary. It just means \\"no God belief,\\" like a-unicornism would mean \\"no unicorn belief.\\" A-unicornism is not a worldview either; it\\'s a belief about a single thing. There are many atheistic worldviews, of course - worldviews which include no god belief. Secular humanism, deep ecology, metaphysical naturalism, extropianism, etc.

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 16:42:05 +0000

What the heck is up with those slashes appearing before my apostrophe's? Stupid IntenseDebate. Is there no comments system that works?

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 16:38:06 +0000

Indeed. If the Biblical Yahweh existed I would condemn him a thousand times as an insane, evil tyrant for his evil acts, bumbling incompetence, and horrific doctrines.

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 16:34:56 +0000

vision, I did not say that sexier debaters would be more convincing. I agree that Craig\\'s arguments fail, but at least he presents valid (but unsound) arguments and argues according to the rules of philosophical logic. Hitchens, it appears, has never read a logic textbook. Of course Shermer makes some great points in that video, but if someone wants to attack Craig\\'s cosmological argument they must realize it is a logically valid argument and then attack the premises, or else attack logic itself.

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 16:30:26 +0000

I\\'ve read John\\'s book and follow his blog. Good stuff. Of course there is no atheist I agree with all the time - and that it partly because I am simply wrong about lots of stuff and I just don\\'t know it yet because people haven\\'t explained it to me in just the right way (whether in books or blog comments or conversations).

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 16:28:23 +0000

That sounds fishy to me, but I'd like to read more. Care to give your name or link to your work, muddle?

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 14:38:40 +0000

Yes, I've always wanted to read the Alston paper. But how is this view compatible with human life having intrinsic moral value? If human life has intrinsic moral value, then it has objective moral value apart from anything outside it - including the nature of God, or any value imparted on human life by God. And yet Craig claims that without God, there are no objective moral values in the universe. These claims seem incompatible to me.

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 14:36:35 +0000

I would say even the violent worshipers of Kali are not proven incorrect, for it is quite possible that a god exists and he is simply evil (and commands evil).

Common Sense Atheism : My Story

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 14:35:16 +0000

Ha!

Common Sense Atheism : The Craig-Hitchens Debate

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 14:33:09 +0000

No, atheism isn't a worldview, but I think Hitchens only concurred with the statement "you cannot judge the truth of a worldview by its social impact."

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 07:35:13 +0000

Bare, uninterpreted experiences are properly basic because they are the only things that literally cannot be wrong. Also, I\\'m not asserting any of this a priori. What I\\'m saying is that when we put logic and evidence to work, it turns out they do a pretty good job of revealing truth in our universe. When we put feelings to work in that task, they do a pretty horrible job. When we trust other unverified testimony, it also turns out to be pretty bad at reliably revealing truth. Etc. None of this is built on a priori assumptions, it\\'s just an observation of how our universe seems to work as we live in it.

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 01:08:39 +0000

I don't know whether foundationalism is better than coherentism or other views. But if foundationalism is best, I certainly wouldn't be willy-nilly about what is allowed in as "properly basic." Certainly, "God exists" or "murder is wrong" wouldn't be "properly basic." Maybe only bare, uninterpreted experience would be allowed in as "properly basic."

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 01:05:12 +0000

And finally, Richard wrote back to me: >>> Well, I would say that a proposition can be meaningless. Take Noam >>> Chomsky's > famous example: "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously". << > > That isn't meaningless to me at all! All terms are clearly defined, and > they are presented in a grammatically meaningful way. It's not > meaningless, it's simply false. For example, it contains a contradiction: > "colorless green." And it has the subject perform an action that is not > logically impossible but is physically impossible in our universe: ideas > do not sleep. Also, ideas are not colored. There is an unusual density of > falsehoods in that proposition, but it's meaning is clear to me - so clear > that I can reject it as false immediately without struggling to understand > the meaning it communicates. > > "Murder is gnorw" on the other hand is meaningless, unless you stipulate a > definition for "gnorw." OK, but then I say "murder is wrong" is meaningless because no one has yet defined "wrong". (Let's set aside for now the question of whether it's a proposition.) > So, what do moral terms mean? This is a bit tricky because different > cultures use them in slightly different ways, but there does seem to be > something common about how they are used such that we could provide a > definition for certain moral terms. Moral terms are perhaps more precisely > used than terms like "love" or "art", but less precisely used than terms > like "tree" or "mother." >> I get the impression that you > only gave up being an error theorist because Alonzo showed you a way to > derive a moral calculus logically from non-moral facts. If I convinced you > that this derivation was invalid, by showing you where some unstated moral > values have been unwittingly smuggled in, do you think this would leave > you > with no reason to believe in objective morality? < > > Yup! I would still spend some time to see if desire utilitarianism could > mount a defense, or be modified to mount a defense - mostly because so > many of my objections to desire utilitarianism have turned out to be > misunderstandings of it - but yes of course I would abandon desire > utilitarianism if it were clearly demonstrated to me that it was false or > incoherent. Besides, error theory is so much less taxing on the brain, and > much easier to defend. :) > > Before we continue, I see that you're posting on the website again. I > think this substantive discussion would be useful to others. If I post it > as a comment to the blog, would you respond there? Yes, please go ahead. Richard.

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 01:04:41 +0000

I wrote back to Richard: >> Well, I would say that a proposition can be meaningless. Take Noam Chomsky's famous example: "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously". << That isn't meaningless to me at all! All terms are clearly defined, and they are presented in a grammatically meaningful way. It's not meaningless, it's simply false. For example, it contains a contradiction: "colorless green." And it has the subject perform an action that is not logically impossible but is physically impossible in our universe: ideas do not sleep. Also, ideas are not colored. There is an unusual density of falsehoods in that proposition, but it's meaning is clear to me - so clear that I can reject it as false immediately without struggling to understand the meaning it communicates. "Murder is gnorw" on the other hand is meaningless, unless you stipulate a definition for "gnorw." So, what do moral terms mean? This is a bit tricky because different cultures use them in slightly different ways, but there does seem to be something common about how they are used such that we could provide a definition for certain moral terms. Moral terms are perhaps more precisely used than terms like "love" or "art", but less precisely used than terms like "tree" or "mother." > I get the impression that you only gave up being an error theorist because Alonzo showed you a way to derive a moral calculus logically from non-moral facts. If I convinced you that this derivation was invalid, by showing you where some unstated moral values have been unwittingly smuggled in, do you think this would leave you with no reason to believe in objective morality? < Yup! I would still spend some time to see if desire utilitarianism could mount a defense, or be modified to mount a defense - mostly because so many of my objections to desire utilitarianism have turned out to be misunderstandings of it - but yes of course I would abandon desire utilitarianism if it were clearly demonstrated to me that it was false or incoherent. Besides, error theory is so much less taxing on the brain, and much easier to defend. :) Before we continue, I see that you're posting on the website again. I think this substantive discussion would be useful to others. If I post it as a comment to the blog, would you respond there? Luke

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 01:04:14 +0000

Richard wrote back: Luke, > Ah, fair enough. Then I have quite a challenge. If you believed moral > terms meant something but just had no referent, than my task would be to > demonstrate that they do indeed have a referent. > > But my task with you is much harder. I must argue that moral terms > actually mean something, and then also that they have a referent. > > You think a moral claim is meaningless, or perhaps just that it does not > express a proposition. I'll hazard you're a non-cognitivist, then? At the moment I'm undecided between several moral anti-realist positions: non-cognitivism, subjectivisim and error theory. I think the differences involve some very difficult and perhaps insoluble issues of semantics. > Here are some reasons to think that moral utterances at least express > propositions, whether or not those propositions are true and have > referents in the real world (taken from Joyce, The Myth of Morality, p. > 13): > > 1. Moral utterances are expressed in the indicative mood. > 2. They can be transformed into interrogative sentences. > 3. They appear embedded in propositional attitude contexts. > 4. They are considered true or false, correct or mistaken. > 5. They are considered to have an impersonal, objective character. > 6. The putative moral predicates can be transformed into abstract singular > terms (e.g., "goodness"), suggesting they are intended to pick out > properties. > 7. They are subject to debate which bears all the hallmarks of factual > disagreement. > 8. They appear in logically complex contexts (e.g., as the antecedents of > conditionals). > 9. They appear as premises in arguments considered valid. > > For these reasons, I think it's pretty likely that moral utterances at > least mean something. Not only that, but they express propositions, such > as "Murder is wrong." [The act of murder has a property of wrongness.] > > Now, moral utterances may be untrue propositions, like "Vishnu is god." > [Vishnu has the property of godness.] But they are at least propositions, > and not meaningless. Well, I would say that a proposition can be meaningless. Take Noam Chomsky's famous example: "Colorless green ideas sleep furiously". It tries to apply properties to concepts to which they are not applicable, e.g. applying colour to an abstract noun. If moral wrongness has no meaning, then it cannot apply to anything. If I wrote "murder is gnorw", you would probably agree that that's meaningless, because "gnorw" is undefined. If I wrote "redrum si gnorw" is that even a proposition? These are difficult semantic/philosophical questions. I prefer to avoid them by simply challenging you to explain what a moral claim means. If no one can explain what it means, then I think I'm entitled to treat it as meaningless, and then I'm not too concerned with whether it's a proposition. > From here, we must tease out just what the heck moral language assumes > itself to be talking about. What does "wrong" or "right" or "good" or > "bad" or "moral" mean? If we can figure out what these terms seem to be > used to make reference to, then we can look and see if those things > actually exist in the universe. For example, we seem to have some idea > what "god" refers to: a powerful magical being that transcends spacetime. > That's not meaningless, either. I just gave you its meaning. It's just > that no such thing with those properties actually exists. > > So, the next step is figure out what people seem to be trying to refer to > with moral terms. Only then can we consider whether or not the things they > refer to actually exist. > > But, what are your thought so far? Well, I'm of the opinion that this plan is doomed to failure. But feel free to continue thinking out loud, and I'll chime in if I have anything to contribute. An alternative line of enquiry occurs to me. I get the impression that you only gave up being an error theorist because Alonzo showed you a way to derive a moral calculus logically from non-moral facts. If I convinced you that this derivation was invalid, by showing you where some unstated moral values have been unwittingly smuggled in, do you think this would leave you with no reason to believe in objective morality? Best wishes, Richard.

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 01:03:40 +0000

I wrote back: Richard, > I've been > saying from the start that I find moral claims to be meaningless (unless > they're interpreted as descriptions of mental states), and I've been > challenging you to say what _you_ mean by them, while expecting you to be > unable to do so. So it's no use asking me what I think they mean. > Ah, fair enough. Then I have quite a challenge. If you believed moral terms meant something but just had no referent, than my task would be to demonstrate that they do indeed have a referent. But my task with you is much harder. I must argue that moral terms actually mean something, and then also that they have a referent. You think a moral claim is meaningless, or perhaps just that it does not express a proposition. I'll hazard you're a non-cognitivist, then? Here are some reasons to think that moral utterances at least express propositions, whether or not those propositions are true and have referents in the real world (taken from Joyce, The Myth of Morality, p. 13): 1. Moral utterances are expressed in the indicative mood. 2. They can be transformed into interrogative sentences. 3. They appear embedded in propositional attitude contexts. 4. They are considered true or false, correct or mistaken. 5. They are considered to have an impersonal, objective character. 6. The putative moral predicates can be transformed into abstract singular terms (e.g., “goodness”), suggesting they are intended to pick out properties. 7. They are subject to debate which bears all the hallmarks of factual disagreement. 8. They appear in logically complex contexts (e.g., as the antecedents of conditionals). 9. They appear as premises in arguments considered valid. For these reasons, I think it's pretty likely that moral utterances at least mean something. Not only that, but they express propositions, such as "Murder is wrong." [The act of murder has a property of wrongness.] Now, moral utterances may be untrue propositions, like "Vishnu is god." [Vishnu has the property of godness.] But they are at least propositions, and not meaningless. >From here, we must tease out just what the heck moral language assumes itself to be talking about. What does "wrong" or "right" or "good" or "bad" or "moral" mean? If we can figure out what these terms seem to be used to make reference to, then we can look and see if those things actually exist in the universe. For example, we seem to have some idea what "god" refers to: a powerful magical being that transcends spacetime. That's not meaningless, either. I just gave you its meaning. It's just that no such thing with those properties actually exists. So, the next step is figure out what people seem to be trying to refer to with moral terms. Only then can we consider whether or not the things they refer to actually exist. But, what are your thought so far? Seeking truth, Luke

Common Sense Atheism : The Wrong Test for Ethical Theories

Sun, 5 Apr 2009 01:03:10 +0000

Richard wrote back: Hi Luke, >> I'm a little disappointed that you've apparently given up on defending >> your position on morality > > I'm spending lots of time defending it on my blog! It should not surprise > you that I occasionally pass off questions to someone who has spent 20 > years > rather than 3 months working on the theory, if he is willing. I'm sorry for my unkind comment above. >> I hope you'll give this some more thought. > Indeed. I'd be quite happy to return to being an error theorist again - > it's > much less taxing on the brain. Much less to defend! In a way, I'm putting > desire utilitarianism out there as publicly as I can so that it will > attract > knowledgeable criticisms like your own. If this kills the theory, then so > much the better. Alonzo himself, who has dedicated his adult life to this > theory, actually expressed this same sentiment to me. Of course he would > be > sad, but he is committed to truth. I'm certainly not very knowledgeable on this subject. But I have tried hard to think carefully about the meanings of words, and not jump to any conclusions about what they mean. >> if you don't want to be poisoned you ought not to drink poison. But >> that's very different from a moral "ought". << > Agreed. But this is how prescription enters the picture. "If Lisa doesn't > want to be poisoned, she ought not to drink poison." That's not > controversial. You're wondering how we get from such hypothetical "oughts" > to moral "oughts." Obviously, if desire utilitarianism fails to account > for > the latter, then it may be a good theory but it is not a theory of > morality. Please be wary about assuming that the two types of "ought" have anything in common apart from the fact that they are both uses of the same English word. Perhaps they have something in common, but you need to be careful to establish what that is if you want to make any connection between them. > So let's break this down. Why ought Lisa not drink poison? Only because > she > desires not to be poisoned. Desires are, as far as we know, the only > reasons > for intentional action that exist. They are the only reasons we do things. > Because Lisa desires to not be poisoned, she has a reason for action to > not > drink poison. But if, for example, she desired to be poisoned, she would > have a reason for action to drink poison. So the statement "If Lisa > doesn't > want to be poisoned, she has reasons for action to [aka she "ought to"] > not > drink point" is both descriptive and prescriptive. If that's how you want to use the word "prescriptive", fine. But then I doubt the word will be of any further use in this discussion, and I for one will try to avoid it. > But there's nothing moral about this kind of "ought." As Alonzo writes: > -------------- > My desires are reasons that exist for my actions. Your desires are reasons > that exist for your actions. My desires are not reasons that exist for > your > actions, nor are your desires reasons that exist for my actions. > As it turns out, if everybody's desire was a reason for everybody else's > action, we would have no need for (criminal) law or morality. Everybody > would automatically consider everybody else's interests. It is because > reasons for action cannot cross personal boundaries that we have a need > for > (criminal) law and morality. -------------- > Before I proceed, I guess I should ask what you think it would mean for > something to have moral value, or for something to be a moral ought. This > is > a semantic question. We may have many statements that are both > descriptively > and prescriptively true, but if they have nothing to do with what we mean > by > "morality", then they are not moral claims. So what do you think it would > mean for something to have moral value, or for something to be a moral > ought? Please excuse me if I have a good-humoured laugh at this point. ;) I've been saying from the start that I find moral claims to be meaningless (unless they're interpreted as descriptions of mental states), and I've been challenging you to say what _you_ mean by them, while expecting you to be unable to do so. So it's no use asking me what I think they mean. Best wishes, Richard.